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Working memory holds the contents of our
thoughts. It acts as a mental sketchpad, providing a
surface on which we can place transitory informa-
tion to hold it “in mind.” We can then “think” by
manipulating this information, such as by combining
it with other items or transforming it into something
new. For example, working memory allows us to re -
member phone numbers, do mental arithmetic, and
plan errands. 
Given its fundamental role in thought it is surpris -
ing that working memory has such a severely limited
capacity: we can only hold a few thoughts in our con -
sciousness at once. In other words, the surface area
of our mental sketchpad is quite small. This limita-
tion is obvious whenever we try to multitask, such as
when we attempt to talk on the phone while writing
an email, and it is why using our mobile phones
while driving increases accident risk, even if we are
using a hands-free set. 
This stands in contrast to other mental abilities
that are not limited, such as long-term memory stor -
age. We can store (seemingly) a lifetime of experi-
ences, but, for some reason, we can only consciously
express these thoughts a few at a time. This limited
capacity may be fundamentally responsible for the
Abstract: Why can your brain store a lifetime of experiences but process only a few thoughts at once? In
this article we discuss “cognitive capacity” (the number of items that can be held “in mind” simul taneously)
and suggest that the limit is inherent to processing based on oscillatory brain rhythms, or “brain waves,”
which may regulate neural communication. Neurons that “hum” together temporarily “wire” to gether,
allowing the brain to form and re-form networks on the fly, which may explain a hallmark of intel ligence
and cognition: mental flexibility. But this comes at a cost; only a small number of thoughts can ½t into each
wave. This explains why you should never talk on a mobile phone when driving. 
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cognitive architecture of our brains: re -
searchers believe it to be the rea son we
have evolved the ability to focus on one
thing at a time (to “attend” to something).
Despite being well studied, no one has yet
con½rmed why working memory is limit-
ed. In this essay, we will review some of
what is known about working memory
capacity and offer our theory of why con-
sciousness may have this limit. 
Though we may feel that we are able to
perceive most of the world around us, this
sensation is, in fact, an illusion constructed
by our brains. In reality, we sense a very
small part of the world at any point in
time; we “sip” at the outside world
through a straw. Our brain takes these
small bits of data and pieces them together
to present an impression of a coherent and
holistic scene. Examples of this limitation
are abundant: consider the puzzles in
which you must identify ten differences
between two similar pictures. The brain
requires a surprisingly long time to accom -
plish this, despite the two pictures being
side by side and the changes often being
obvious, such as the total disappearance of
a building or tree. This effect is often re -
ferred to as change blindness and is a regu-
lar occurrence of natural vision. (Another
example of change blindness is the large
num ber of editing mistakes we fail to no -
tice in movies.)
The limited bandwidth of consciousness
is also apparent in studies of working
mem ory capacity. In these experiments,
subjects briefly view a screen with a vari-
able number of objects (such as colored
squares) and then, after a delay of a few
sec onds in which they must hold the ob -
jects in memory, they are shown another
screen of objects, one of which may be dif -
ferent from what was previously shown.1
Subjects are then asked whether some-
thing has changed, and if so, to identify
how it has changed (whether it used to be
a different color or shape). When the num -
ber of objects on-screen increases beyond
a few items, subjects begin to make errors
(by missing changes), indicating that their
working memory capacity has been ex -
ceeded. Experiments such as this have re -
vealed that the average adult human can
only process and retain four or ½ve objects
at a time (similar to the average monkey,
as shown below).2 The exact capacity of
the brain varies by individual; some can re -
member only one or two items and others
can remember up to seven.3 Interestingly,
an individual’s capacity is highly correlat-
ed with measures of fluid intelligence, sug -
gesting that individual capacity limits may
be a fundamental restriction on high-level
cognition.4 This seems intuitive: if you can
hold more information in mind at the same
time, then more ideas can be combined at
once into sophisticated thought. 
But what is the nature of the capacity
limitation? Do we simply miss new items
once we have ½lled our thoughts with four
or ½ve? Or do we always try to take in as
much information as possible, eventually
spreading ourselves too thin when there
are more than four or ½ve objects present?
In fact, both may be true.
Models of a strict limit on the number
of items you can hold in mind posit that
this is because working memory has a lim -
ited number of discrete “slots,” each of
which can independently hold informa-
tion. And once you ½ll those slots, you can
no longer store any new information. In
contrast, other models predict that our
lim ited capacity is due to our spreading
our selves too thin. They suggest that work -
ing memory is a flexible resource, a neu-
ral pool that can be subdivided among ob -
jects. You do not stop storing new infor-
mation after you reach a ½xed capacity as
in the slot model; rather, as new informa-
tion is received, the resource pool is con-
tinually divided until the information is
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curately recalled (and therefore cannot
support behavior). Much evidence has
been marshaled on behalf of both models,
primarily from studies of the patterns of
errors humans make on tests of cognitive
capacity. Recently, we examined the neu-
rophysiological mechanisms underlying
capacity limits in monkeys. We found an
intriguing possibility: both the slot and
flexible-resource models are correct, albeit
for different reasons. 
The advantages of animal work include
tighter control over gaze as well as more
precise measurements of neural activity
than is possible with human subjects.
These advantages allowed us to dig deeper
into the phenomenon and led to a surpris-
ing discovery. The monkeys, like humans,
had an overall capacity of four objects. But
the monkeys’ overall capacity was actually
composed of two separate capacities of
two objects each in the right and left visual
hemi½elds (to the right and left of the cen -
 ter of gaze) that were independent of each
other. The processing of objects on the
right half of gaze is unaffected by objects
in the left half of gaze, regardless of how
many ob jects there were on the left (and
vice versa). But adding even one object on
the same side of gaze as another object re -
sulted in a decrement in performance. It
was as if the monkeys had two separate
brains, each one assigned to the right or left
half of vi sion. This right/left independence
was sur prising, though research focusing
on a dif ferent type of task might have pre-
dicted it: humans have independent ca -
pacities to track moving objects in the right
and left visual hemi½elds.5
This phenomenon is likely related to the
fact that the right and left visual hemi -
½elds are respectively processed by the left
and right cerebral hemispheres. This sug-
gests that the two cerebral hemispheres can
operate somewhat independently, at least
for the processing required for visual infor -
mation to reach awareness. Indeed, the ap -
parent split between the two hemispheres
recalls some of the initial observations of
hu mans who had their cerebral hemi-
spheres split to control epilepsy. With out
care ful testing, these subjects usually ap -
peared normal. Thus, there may be some-
thing of a split even in the intact brain:
the two visual hemi½elds/cerebral hemi-
spheres act like two independent slots for
processing and holding visual information.
At ½rst blush, this seems to support the slot
model, with slots for both the left and right
½elds of vision. But we also found evidence
to support the flexible-resource model
within each visual hemi ½eld: on each side of
visual space, information was shared and
spread among ob jects. To show this, we
looked more closely at how neurons en -
coded the contents of working memory.
A pure slot model predicts that encoding
an object is all-or-none: if the brain suc-
cessfully remembers an object, there
should be an equal amount of information
about it regardless of how many other ob -
jects are in the array. But we found that
even when a given object was successfully
encoded and retained, neural information
about that speci½c object was reduced
when another object was added to the
same visual hemi½eld, as if a limited
amount of neural information was spread
between the objects. The slot mod el also
predicts that if a subject misses an object,
no information about it should be recorded
in the brain; either an object ½lls a slot,
and is remembered, or not. By contrast,
the flexible-resource model suggests that
even when a subject misses an object, some
information about the object could have
been recorded in the brain, just not enough
to support conscious perception and mem -
ory. This latter prediction is exactly what
we found: even when a subject did not
consciously perceive the object, the brain
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In sum, the two cerebral hemispheres
(visual hemi½elds) act like discrete re -
source slots; within them, neural informa -
tion is divided among objects in a graded
fashion. A number of recent studies in hu -
mans support such a hybrid model, ½nding
that there are multiple slots that can store
graded information about objects.6 Thus,
capacity limits may reflect interplay or
blend between different types of underly-
ing constraints on neural processing. On
the one hand, neural processing on the
right and left halves of visual space can be
slot-like, akin to buckets that can hold a
maximum volume of water (information).
But, on the other hand, within each cere-
bral hemisphere there is no limit to the
num ber of objects (thoughts) in each
buck et. The limitation is inherent to the
in formation, not the number of objects:
if there are too many items in the bucket,
only a few can get wet enough (have
enough information devoted to them) to
reach consciousness. The rest may get a lit -
tle damp, but it is not enough to act upon.
Whether or not the two cerebral hemi-
spheres have independent capacities for
information other than vision remains to
be determined. It may prove only to be a
visual phenomenon, due to the fact that
the right and left of gaze are primarily pro -
cessed in the left and right cerebral hemi-
spheres, respectively. But even if this in -
dependence is limited to vision, it has clear
practical implications. For example, tak-
ing into account the separate capacities
of the right and left of gaze can help in the
design of heads-up displays, such as on
au tomobile windshields, maximizing the
amount of information that drivers can
glean in each glance, or providing infor-
mation without overloading their capacity
to fully process important visual scenes,
such as the road in front of them.
So far we have seen that despite our im -
pression that we can store and perceive a
signi½cant amount of visual information
at once, this is not the case. We can only
simultaneously think about a very limited
amount of information. Our brains knit
together these sips of information to give
us the illusion that we have a much larger
functional bandwidth. (Again, this is
some thing to keep in mind the next time
you are driving and have an urge to reach
for your mobile phone.) But this still does
not explain why there is a capacity limit for
conscious thought. What about the brain’s
functioning dictates such a small band-
width? 
Why can’t you hold one thousand
thoughts in mind simultaneously, or even
just one hundred? There is mounting evi-
dence that the brain uses oscillatory
rhythms (brain waves) for communica-
tion, especially for processes underlying
high-level cognition. The theory is that the
brain forms networks by synchronizing
oscillations (rhythmic or repetitive neural
activity) of the neurons that make up that
network. Neurons that “hum” together
form networks, and because only so much
information can ½t into each oscillatory
cycle, any communication system based
on an oscillating signal will naturally have
a limitation on bandwidth. But before delv -
ing into the content limits of an oscillatory
cycle, what is the evidence supporting a
role for oscillatory activity in brain func-
tion to begin with? 
It has long been known that the brain has
large populations of neurons that oscillate
in synchrony. These so-called brain waves
occur across a wide range of frequencies
from very low (less than once a second, or
< 1 Hz) to very high (almost once every 15
ms, or > 60 Hz). Brain waves are not ran-
dom: they vary with mental state. For ex -
ample, when you are relaxed, your brain
tends to show lower frequency waves; but
if you suddenly focus on a task, brain re -
gions that are needed to perform that task
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Despite the evidence that brain waves are
important for behavior, their exact role in
brain function has long been a mystery.
Beginning with the pioneering work of
physicist and neurobiologist Christoph
von der Malsburg, neurophysiologist Wolf
Singer, and their colleagues, there has been
increasing awareness that synchronizing
the oscillations between neurons may be
critical in forming functional networks. 
Synchronized oscillations are useful for
increasing the impact of neural impulses
(“spikes,” or sharp changes in voltage that
neurons use when they signal one anoth-
er). Spikes from two neurons that arrive
simultaneously at a third neuron down-
stream have a greater impact than if the im -
pulses arrived at different times.7 Given
this, it is easy to imagine how such a mech -
anism could be useful to focus mental ef -
fort on particular representations (when
we pay attention). After all, if synchroniz-
ing the rhythms of neurons increases the
impact of their spikes, then one way to
boost the neural signals associated with an
attended object would be to increase syn-
chrony between neurons representing it. 
There is growing evidence that this is ex -
actly how attention works. Increased at -
ten tional focus increases oscillatory syn-
chrony between the visual cortical neurons
that represent the attended stimulus. For
example, visual cortical neurons that pro -
cess a stimulus under attentional focus
show increased synchronized gamma band
(30–90 Hz) oscillations.8 This higher fre -
quency (> 30 Hz) synchrony may result
from interactions within local cortical cir -
cuits,9 the same interactions that underlie
the computations of stimulus features.10
By contrast, sensory cortical neurons rep -
resenting an unattended stimulus show in -
creased low frequency (< 17 Hz) synchro-
nization. A variety of evidence suggests
that low frequencies may help deselect or
inhibit the corresponding ensembles (pop -
ulations of neurons that together underlie
a particular thought, perception, memory,
or neural computation), perhaps by dis-
rupting the higher frequency.11
On a broader scale, synchrony between
regions may also regulate communication
across brain areas.12 In short, if two dif-
ferent networks in different brain areas os -
cillate in phase (a particular moment with a
neural oscillation, such as a speci½c “piece”
of a brain wave) they are more likely to
influence one another because both are in
an excited and receptive state at the same
time. Conversely, if they are out of phase,
information will be transmitted poorly.
This is supported by observations that in -
terareal oscillatory coherence within and
between “cognitive” regions and sensory
areas has been found to increase with at -
tention.13 In other words, if two brain areas
are involved in a given cognitive function
(such as visual attention), they increase
their synchrony during that function.
We have discussed how synchronized
rhythms can change the flow of informa-
tion between neurons and between brain
regions. Recent work has begun to suggest
that synchrony may not only control com -
munication between networks, it may ac -
tually form the networks themselves. The
classic model suggests that if neurons are
anatomically connected, then they are part
of the same network; but it may be that
anat omy dictates which neurons are capa-
ble of forming networks. The actual forma-
tion of the networks may instead come
through synchrony (Figure 1). In other
words, anatomy is like a system of roads;
synchrony is the traf½c. Importantly, dy -
namic formation of ensembles by oscilla-
tory synchrony may underlie cognitive
flex ibility: our ability to rapidly change
thoughts and behavior from one moment
to the next.
Consider, for example, what is widely
assumed to be the basic element of a
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tive together. Such an ensemble can form
a perception, memory, or idea. But how
does the brain form a particular neural
ensemble for a speci½c thought? This is
not straightforward; there are billions of
neurons linked to each other through tril-
lions of connections. This is further com-
plicated because neurons have multiple
func tions, particularly at “higher,” more
cognitive levels of the brain.14 Thus, many
neurons inhabit many different ensembles
and, conversely, ensembles for different
thoughts share some of the same neurons.
If anatomy were all there were to forming
ensembles, then attempting to activate
one ensemble would result in activity that
extended to other ensembles, and subse-
quently a jumble of thoughts. 
We propose that the role of synchrony is
to dynamically “carve” an ensemble from
a greater heterogeneous population of neu -
rons15 by reinforcing mutual activation be -
tween the neurons that form the ensem-
ble.16 Because ensemble membership
would depend on which neurons are oscil -
lating in synchrony at a given mo ment,
ensembles could flexibly form, break-apart,
and re-form without changing their anatomical
structure. In other words, for mation of en -
sem bles by rhythmic synchrony endows
Figure 1
Synchronous Oscillations Create Neural Ensembles
(A) The human brain consists of almost one hundred billion neurons that form a dense network of connections.
This network of neurons and their trillions of connections encapsulate all possible behaviors (and their associated
sensations, thoughts, and actions). (B) In order to execute a particular behavior, synchrony activates only those
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thought with flexibility, a hallmark of high -
er cognition. Humans can quickly adapt
and change their thoughts and behaviors
in order to tailor them to the constantly
changing demands of our complex world.
Thus, networks have to be as sembled, de -
constructed, and recon½gured from mo -
ment to moment as our foci, plans, and
goals change. This is not meant to down -
play the role of neural plas ticity in chang-
ing the weights of connections be tween
neu rons and in forming new ana tomical
connections; it is always important to
build and maintain roads. 
Through a study in which we trained
mon keys to switch back and forth between
two tasks, we recently found evidence that
synchronized oscillations can provide the
substrate for dynamic formation of ensem -
bles. As the monkeys switched tasks, dif-
ferent sets of neurons in the prefrontal
cortex showed synchronous oscillations–
one for each task–in the beta band (about
25 Hz) synchrony, as if the neurons were
switching from one network to the oth er.17
Importantly, many of the neurons were
multifunctional, synchronizing their activ-
ity to one ensemble or the other depend-
ing on the task at hand. This supports the
idea that synchrony can dynamically form
(and disassemble) ensembles from ana -
tomical networks of neurons that partici-
pate in multiple ensembles.
Interestingly, one of the two tasks was
much easier for the monkeys to perform;
and when the monkeys prepared to engage
in the harder task, the neurons that formed
the network for the easier task showed syn -
chrony in a low-frequency alpha range
(about 10 Hz). Alpha waves have been as -
sociated with suppression or inattention
to a stimulus18 and are therefore thought
to inhibit irrelevant processes.19 In our ex -
periment, alpha oscillation inhibition
seemed to be acting to quiet the dominant
network (the one needed for the easier
task), which would have interfered with
the network needed for the current, more
challenging task. This suggests that syn-
chronous os cillations helped control the
formation of ensembles.20 Higher (beta)
frequencies de ½ned the two task networks
while lower (alpha) frequencies were used
to somehow disrupt formation of the stron -
ger network (and thus prevent an errone -
ous reflexive re action) when the weaker
network had to be used. 
If synchronized rhythms form neural en -
sembles, it follows to wonder how it is that
the brain can form more than one ensem-
ble at a time. After all, would not two rhyth -
mically de½ned ensembles inadvertently
synchronize to each other, merging togeth-
er and distorting the information they rep -
resent? In response, some researchers have
proposed that the brain forms more than
one ensemble at a time by oscillating dif-
ferent ensembles slightly out of phase with
one another. 
According to this theory, neurons that
are part of a speci½c ensemble do not only
synchronize their activity, but they do so
by aligning their spikes to speci½c phases
of neuronal population oscillations.21 By
separating thoughts into different phases
of population oscillations, our brain can
hold multiple thoughts in mind simulta-
neously (Figure 2).22 In other words, the
brain prevents ensembles from interfering
with one another by juggling them, rhyth -
mically activating each in turn (out of phase
from each other). We recently reported ev -
idence for this multiplexing when infor-
mation is held in mind.23 When monkeys
hold multiple objects in working memory,
prefrontal neurons encode information
about each object at different phases of an
ongoing (~ 32 Hz) oscillation. Signi½cantly,
there were bumps of information at dif-
ferent phases, yet in all phases the neu-
rons still carried at least some information,
supporting a hybrid slot/flexible-resource
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some what slot-like in the sense that they
are speci½c to certain phases of the oscil-
lation; but they are not strict slots because
the bump is a relative increase over infor-
mation in other phases. The effect was 
not all-or-none, information-here-but-not-
there, as is predicted by a strict slot model.
This ½nally leads us to an explanation for
the severe limitation of conscious thought.
Phase-based coding has an inherent ca -
pacity limitation. You have to ½t all the
in formation needed for conscious thought
within an oscillatory cycle. Consciousness
may thus be a mental juggling act, and only
a few balls can be juggled at once. Crucial
tests of this hypothesis still need to be con -
ducted, but these ½ndings and theories
collectively suggest that bringing thoughts
to consciousness may depend on genera-
tion of oscillatory rhythms and the precise
temporal relationships between them and
the spiking of individual neurons.
Figure 2
Phase Coding
This ½gure illustrates oscillatory phase-coding. Neural ensembles of the two simultaneous thoughts (thoughts 1
and 2) oscillate at similar frequencies but different phases of the oscillation. In other words, the ensembles line
up on different parts of the brain wave. This may explain the severely limited capacity of consciousness; in this
model, only a few thoughts can ½t in each wave. Source: Earl K. Miller and Timothy J. Buschman, “Brain Rhythms
for Cognition and Consciousness,” in Neurosciences and the Human Person: New Perspectives on Human Activities, ed.
Antonio M. Battro, Stanislas Dehaene, and Wolf Joachim Singer (Vatican City: Ponti½cal Academy of Sciences,
Scripta Varia 121, 2013).
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